The order had come directly from Hitler. The three days pause was intended, though Hitler did not tell his generals at the time, to allow Britain's best fighting force escape by ship across the Channel to England. He intended it as a clear gesture of good will towards his British adversary.
That was the "miracle of Dunkirk" which Churchill's strictly censored wartime press propaganda in England portrayed as divine providence smiling down on the chosen British people. The British population would have been no doubt quite surprised, had they been allowed to learn the truth, that the one who had smiled on their army at Dunkirk had in fact been Hitler.
A week later, referring to this "miracle of Dunkirk" Churchill told the House of Commons and the entire nation over the BBC radio, "We shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be; we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender"... It wasn't exactly the response Hitler had in mind.
Dunkirk was to be only one of several unusual military decisions by the German Fuhrer in those critical days. His message each time was intended as a clear signal of good will and benevolent magnanimity to his opponents. He was determined to give England convincing proof of his ultimate good will towards the British Empire, by allowing the elite of Britain's fighting forces to escape to England.
Once France had proposed armistice, yet again, Hitler refused to follow the logic of the military situation to its conclusion. He agreed to the basic French terms of Petain, and allowed two-fifths of France to the south, including the major Mediterranean port city, Marseilles, to remain unoccupied under Petain and Laval and their own French military and police control.
The colonies and the formidable French naval fleet were left untouched by Hitler, in his unusual gesture of good will. Allowing Petain's Vichy government to hold the colonies in French North and West Africa was an astonishing concession from any military standpoint. Had Germany taken the African colonies at the fall of France, that would have closed the Mediterranean to British ships, allowing Italy a free-hand to invade Egypt from Libya, blocking the Suez Canal and the route to the Mideast, as well as India.
German U-boats, operating out of the French colonial port of Dakar on the west coast of Africa could have blocked British ships en route to India via South Africa. That would have choked off vital British oil supplies from Iran and the Middle East, and cut off her access to goods and soldiers from India, placing her naval fleet and her economy in a devastating disadvantage at a time when many in top British political circles, even some in Churchill's Cabinet such as Beaverbrook, were resigned to the inevitability of a peace deal with Hitler.
At a meeting June 17 in Munich, the day France's armistice offer was received, Hitler told Mussolini that he would not impose oppressive conditions on France. When Mussolini suggested the demand that France turn over its naval fleet, Hitler rejected that idea outright as well. This concession too, allowing the Petain government to hold on to the French fleet, was no small thing. At the time, the French naval fleet, unlike other parts of its defense arsenal, was of high quality.
What could be of such over-riding importance in Hitler's thinking as to justify so extraordinary concessions as the colonies, the fleet and almost half of French territory? Hitler, after refusing Mussolini's demand for the French fleet, turned to the real subject on his mind: England. In a discussion witnessed by Hitler's official interpreter, Paul Schmidt, Hitler told Mussolini he was convinced it would not serve any useful purpose to destroy the British Empire. "It is, after all, a force for order in the world," insisted Hitler.
As Holland, Belgium, Norway, Denmark, half of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and now most of France all had been incorporated into the New European Order of the Third Reich, Italy, and Spain bound to it by alliance, Hitler came back to the idea of recarving the world between a land empire of Eurasia dominated by Germany, and a global oceanic empire dominated by Britain. Hitler was preparing for the great battle, and it was to be in the east, not the west. He wanted England's assurance that she would "cover Germany's back," or at least not embroil the Reich once more in a catastrophic two front war.
from: "Hitler's Fundamental Miscalculation” by F. William Engdahl in Halford MacKinder’s Necessary War.
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Another interesting view...
Why Did Hitler Let the British Go?
The order had come directly from Hitler. The three days pause was intended, though Hitler did not tell his generals at the time, to allow Britain's best fighting force escape by ship across the Channel to England. He intended it as a clear gesture of good will towards his British adversary.
That was the "miracle of Dunkirk" which Churchill's strictly censored wartime press propaganda in England portrayed as divine providence smiling down on the chosen British people. The British population would have been no doubt quite surprised, had they been allowed to learn the truth, that the one who had smiled on their army at Dunkirk had in fact been Hitler.
A week later, referring to this "miracle of Dunkirk" Churchill told the House of Commons and the entire nation over the BBC radio, "We shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be; we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender"... It wasn't exactly the response Hitler had in mind.
Dunkirk was to be only one of several unusual military decisions by the German Fuhrer in those critical days. His message each time was intended as a clear signal of good will and benevolent magnanimity to his opponents. He was determined to give England convincing proof of his ultimate good will towards the British Empire, by allowing the elite of Britain's fighting forces to escape to England.
Once France had proposed armistice, yet again, Hitler refused to follow the logic of the military situation to its conclusion. He agreed to the basic French terms of Petain, and allowed two-fifths of France to the south, including the major Mediterranean port city, Marseilles, to remain unoccupied under Petain and Laval and their own French military and police control.
The colonies and the formidable French naval fleet were left untouched by Hitler, in his unusual gesture of good will. Allowing Petain's Vichy government to hold the colonies in French North and West Africa was an astonishing concession from any military standpoint. Had Germany taken the African colonies at the fall of France, that would have closed the Mediterranean to British ships, allowing Italy a free-hand to invade Egypt from Libya, blocking the Suez Canal and the route to the Mideast, as well as India.
German U-boats, operating out of the French colonial port of Dakar on the west coast of Africa could have blocked British ships en route to India via South Africa. That would have choked off vital British oil supplies from Iran and the Middle East, and cut off her access to goods and soldiers from India, placing her naval fleet and her economy in a devastating disadvantage at a time when many in top British political circles, even some in Churchill's Cabinet such as Beaverbrook, were resigned to the inevitability of a peace deal with Hitler.
At a meeting June 17 in Munich, the day France's armistice offer was received, Hitler told Mussolini that he would not impose oppressive conditions on France. When Mussolini suggested the demand that France turn over its naval fleet, Hitler rejected that idea outright as well. This concession too, allowing the Petain government to hold on to the French fleet, was no small thing. At the time, the French naval fleet, unlike other parts of its defense arsenal, was of high quality.
What could be of such over-riding importance in Hitler's thinking as to justify so extraordinary concessions as the colonies, the fleet and almost half of French territory? Hitler, after refusing Mussolini's demand for the French fleet, turned to the real subject on his mind: England. In a discussion witnessed by Hitler's official interpreter, Paul Schmidt, Hitler told Mussolini he was convinced it would not serve any useful purpose to destroy the British Empire. "It is, after all, a force for order in the world," insisted Hitler.
As Holland, Belgium, Norway, Denmark, half of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and now most of France all had been incorporated into the New European Order of the Third Reich, Italy, and Spain bound to it by alliance, Hitler came back to the idea of recarving the world between a land empire of Eurasia dominated by Germany, and a global oceanic empire dominated by Britain. Hitler was preparing for the great battle, and it was to be in the east, not the west. He wanted England's assurance that she would "cover Germany's back," or at least not embroil the Reich once more in a catastrophic two front war.
from: "Hitler's Fundamental Miscalculation” by F. William Engdahl in Halford MacKinder’s Necessary War.